Quote:
Originally Posted by rocket357
But that begs the question...Wouldn't it be easier to just insert a backdoor into something like GCC? It would be virtually impossible to detect (without auditing the compiler...and gcc's a big beast) because you wouldn't have to alter the source of the program you're attempting to backdoor. Even OpenBSD's code-correctness approach could be undermined by a compromised compiler...and compromising GCC would have the added benefit of affecting many other operating systems. Seems that would give more bang for the buck, you know?
|
Yes, as seen in the well‐known
Reflections on Trusting Trust.
But just because a compiler would be a great target doesn’t mean that an IPSEC stack would
not be a target.
I’m not suggesting that there is a backdoor in OpenBSD; in fact, I think it’s extremely unlikely. But that doesn’t mean that we don’t need to audit—constant auditing is a good thing whether we believe in backdoors or not. And this is proven by the fact that the audit has already fixed two bugs that were
not backdoors.
I think this is the view that Theo holds as well:
Quote:
It is an allegation in a world where we audit whether there is an allegation or not.
If I read you right, what you are saying can be simplified to this:
“Because this is an allegation, we need not audit. Hey, let’s post instead!”
I am sorry, but even if you don’t mean it exactly like that, what you said will be interpreted by many people to mean that. What I see you say above [is] ridiculous.
|